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ABSTRACT
Policy evaluation has grown signiﬁcantly in the EU environmental sector since
the 1990s. In identifying and exploring the putative drivers behind its rise –
a desire to learn, a quest for greater accountability, and a wish to manipulate
political opportunity structures – new ground is broken by examining how
and why the existing literatures on these drivers have largely studied them in
isolation. The complementarities and potential tensions between the three
drivers are then addressed in order to advance existing research, drawing on
emerging empirical examples in climate policy, a very dynamic area of evalua-
tion activity in the EU. The conclusions suggest that future studies should
explore the interactions between the three drivers to open up new and
exciting research opportunities in order to comprehend contemporary envir-
onmental policy and politics in the EU.
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Introduction
In the 25 years since Environmental Politics published its seminal special
issue on European Union (EU) environmental policy (Judge 1992), policy
evaluation (hereafter ‘evaluation’) has ﬂourished. Our contribution seeks to
identify the core drivers that lie behind the EU’s increasing proclivity to
evaluate its environmental policies. Doing so matters because the resources
committed to evaluation are substantial. In 2007, the European Commission
employed 140 full-time staﬀ in this area and spent 45 million Euros (Højlund
2015, p. 36). These investments are generating signiﬁcant outputs in the form
of new, policy-relevant knowledge. Mastenbroek et al. (2016) found that the
European Commission initiated 216 ex-post legislative evaluations between
2000 and 2012, with signiﬁcant growth in more recent years: ‘nearly 200
evaluations were published [by the Commission] … between January 2015
and mid-October 2016 […]’ Schreﬂer (2016, p. 6). These numbers only
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partially represent total evaluation output, given that other institutions, such
as the European Court of Auditors (Stephenson 2015) and the European
Parliament, as well as non-governmental organisations and industry associa-
tions, also evaluate (see Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017). The European
Environment Agency (EEA) recently wrote that ‘[t]he evaluation of environ-
ment and climate policies is, today, a well-established discipline’ (2016, p. 4).
Textbooks on EU environmental policy now incorporate chapters on evalua-
tion (e.g. Mickwitz 2013); a meta-analysis conducted at a time when climate
policy outputs were growing rapidly, found over 250 evaluations in the sub-
area of climate policy (Haug et al. 2010, Huitema et al. 2011).
While evaluation has become an established feature of EU environmen-
tal policymaking, it is much less clear why this has occurred. What are the
key motivations of those engaging in evaluation? And to what extent can
evaluation fulﬁl their aspirations? We follow Vedung (1997, p. 3) in deﬁn-
ing evaluation as a ‘careful retrospective assessment of the merit, worth and
value of administration, output and outcome of government interventions,
which is intended to play a role in future, practical action situations’. The
key word is ‘retrospective’; we focus here on ex-post evaluations (see also
Mickwitz 2006, Crabbé and Leroy 2008), rather than on their ex-nunc
(ongoing – see Crabbé and Leroy 2008) or ex-ante (prospective) elements
(see Adelle et al. 2012, Turnpenny et al. 2016).
Until now, evaluation scholars have mainly concentrated on developing
evaluation methods (e.g. Vedung 1997, Pawson and Tilley 2014), including
on environmental policy (Mickwitz 2003, Crabbé and Leroy 2008). Work
exploring the underlying drivers of evaluation has emerged only quite
recently. Even though the 1992 special issue considered implementation
(Collins and Earnshaw 1992), it did not address evaluation. Very few
scholars have worked speciﬁcally on environmental evaluation in the EU
(but see Mickwitz 2013).
The general neglect of evaluation matters because there are multiple
reasons why actors may advocate, commission, fund, undertake, enact,
and/or respond to evaluation. Scholars such as Radaelli (2010) and Adelle
et al. (2012) have explored the politics of ex-ante impact assessment, but
this has been much less the case for ex-post evaluation. Another key short-
coming in the ex-post evaluation literatures is that few scholars have
considered multiple evaluation drivers together. Most existing accounts
analyse the drivers in isolation (e.g. Bovens et al. 2006). For example,
even though the prominent evaluation scholar Elinor Chelimsky asserts
that ‘[m]y point is that claiming a unique purpose for evaluation ﬂies in
the face of past and current practice’ (2006, p. 36), she neglects political
aspects in her own review of the ﬁeld. Our core aim is to incorporate all
three drivers of evaluation, namely: a quest for learning; an enabler
of accountability; and a way to manipulate political opportunity structures.
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We proceed as follows. The next section reviews the emergence of evalua-
tion (and especially environmental evaluation) in the EU. It focuses on evalua-
tion’s role in the EU Environmental Action Programmes (EAP), which the EU
publishes regularly in order to guide and frame its environmental policy work.
Their strategic nature makes them a suitable indicator of deeper shifts in EU
environmental policy-making (see Mickwitz 2013). The third section returns
to the three evaluation drivers outlined above and explores them theoretically,
drawing on new empirical insights which are beginning to appear in the
literature. The fourth section conceptualises the interaction between the dri-
vers, drawing on emerging empirical evidence. The ﬁfth draws together the
main ﬁndings, concludes, and identiﬁes new research needs.
Emergence of environmental policy evaluation in the EU
Most histories of evaluation identify its origins in the USA where actors
assessed social policy in the 1960s (Toulemonde 2000, Stame 2003). About
two decades later, the rise of New Public Management, which aims at more
eﬃcient and eﬀective policy-making, proved inﬂuential in popularising evalua-
tion in Europe (Pattyn 2014, Pattyn et al. 2018). Other factors include EU
enlargement, and a perceived need to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of structural
and cohesion funding that was increasingly being dispersed east and south-
wards (e.g. Batterbury 2006) as well as encouragement from the OECD and the
World Bank (Toulemonde 2000, Uitto 2016). More recently, scholars have also
noted ‘better regulation’ initiatives and concerns over policy eﬀectiveness in
a world of dwindling public budgets as potential drivers (see EEA 2016).
Environment and climate change evaluation only emerged in the mid-
1990s in the EU – largely following similar earlier trends in the USA
(Knaap and Kim 1998, p. 23, see also Feldman and Wilt 1996). One reason
for this lag may be that, as Toulemonde writes, ‘professional [evaluation]
networks have remained highly compartmentalised and hardly inclined to
bridge the gap with other sectors’ (2000, p. 351). Professional evaluators
have typically focused on the EU ﬁelds where evaluation ﬁrst developed,
notably structural funds and research policy. However, policymakers were
equally slow to demand evaluations of environmental policy. While evalua-
tion ﬁrst centred on spending policies, environmental policy was, and to
a large extent remains, a regulatory aﬀair in order to avoid distortions in
the common market (Knill and Lieﬀerink 2013) and has thus often been
subjected to less evaluation. Regulation tends to be less political because the
beneﬁts it generates tend to be diﬀuse and slow to appear (see Majone
1994). It also took time for the environmental acquis to expand enough to
generate eﬀects that demanded evaluating (as happened in the USA, where
environmental evaluation only really emerged a decade or so after signiﬁ-
cant legislation had been adopted – see Knaap and Kim 1998, p. 23).
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However, EU environmental policy could not escape these broader
trends forever (e.g. Toulemonde 2000, Mickwitz 2006, 2013, Stame 2008,
EEA 2016). Evaluation did not suddenly appear in the environmental
sector; rather, it gradually built over time. Some of its origins lie in earlier
practices such as regulatory impact assessment. To trace this development,
it is worth exploring evaluation’s rising prominence in the EU’s EAPs over
time. These programmes identify strategic priorities for EU environmental
policy, including in evaluation (see Mickwitz 2006). Table 1 summarises the
appearance of ‘assessment’ and ‘evaluation’ in the seven EAPs to date.
Table 1 reveals that references to policy assessment date back to the ﬁrst
EAP, but have strengthened and become more common over time. The
excerpts reveal how successive EAPs have deﬁned assessments more concretely
with more speciﬁc language on methodology. The focus has evolved from
Table 1. Evaluation in the EU’s environmental action programmes.
EAP Number
& Year References to evaluation
1st (1973) The protection of the environment […] inevitably involves various kinds of
expenditure […] It is essential that the authorities make accurate assessments
of the size of this expenditure in order to have a clear idea of what the
economic, ﬁnancial and social repercussions of proposed decisions are
likely to be[…] (p. 31; emphasis added)
2nd (1977) The Commission will try to ﬁnd a method of costing anti-pollution measures…
(p. 37; emphasis added)
3rd (1983) Environmental impact assessment is the prime instrument for ensuring that
environmental data is taken into account in the decision-making process. (p. 6;
emphasis added)
4th (1987) […] Community environment actions shall take account of the potential beneﬁts
and costs of action or of lack of action. The Commission will endeavour to
develop methods of assessment which will facilitate this task and which will,
so far as possible, ensure the preparation of an adequate cost beneﬁt analysis
as a basis for environmental proposals. (p. 14; emphasis added)
5th (1993) […] the design and the choice of environmental priorities must be elaborated,
based on the fullest possible assessment of all relevant costs and
beneﬁts. (p. 97; emphasis added)
6th (2002) […] improvement of the process of policy making through:
– ex-ante evaluation of the possible impacts, in particular the environmental
impacts, of new policies including the alternative of no action and of the
proposals for legislation and publication of the results;
– ex-post evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of existing measures in meeting their
environmental objectives […] (p. 13–14; emphasis added)
7th (2013) In order to improve environmental integration and policy coherence, the 7th EAP
shall ensure that by 2020: […]
This requires, in particular:
(i) integrating environmental and climate-related conditionalities […] in policy
initiatives, including reviews and reforms of existing policy, as well as new
initiatives, at Union and Member State level;
(ii) carrying out ex-ante assessments of the environmental, social and
economic impacts of policy initiatives […] to ensure their coherence and
eﬀectiveness;
[…]
(iv) using ex-post evaluation information relating to experience with
implementation of the environment acquis in order to improve its consistency
and coherence […] (p. 195–196; emphasis added)
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environment-related expenditure to incorporating economic eﬀects, including
costs and beneﬁts, and, from 1987, the costs of inaction. However, explicit
references to ex-post evaluation only emerged in the 6th and 7th EAPs (see also
Mickwitz 2013), which was about ten years after evaluation became a standard
part of the policy repertoire in the USA. A 1996 Communication by the
Commission sought to systematise evaluation practices in the EU (European
Commission 1996). Recent research shows that compared to other policy
areas, DG Environment initiated a moderate level (around 40) of legislative ex-
post evaluations between 2000 and 2014 (van Voorst and Mastenbroek 2017).
Evaluation practices have thus grown rapidly in the EU since the late 1990s,
often in the absence of a clear blueprint from the Commission or the Member
States. But what are the deeper drivers of this trend? The following section
identiﬁes and explores three core drivers in detail.
Evaluation drivers: existing debates
Academic literatures on EU evaluation have, over time, consistently and
repeatedly stressed three underlying drivers of evaluation. Two drivers that
often feature in evaluation debates are accountability and learning – the latter
often starting from the idea of evaluation as the last ‘stage’ in a stylised ‘policy
cycle’ (Hanberger 2012, Vo and Christie 2015). However, actors may use
evaluation in order to manipulate political opportunity structures, from
using evaluation to delay processes through to legitimising pre-existing policy
actions (Hanberger 2012). This section assesses these debates with a view to
identifying what we know about the three drivers (see also Vedung 1997, p. 13).
Accountability
Many existing literatures focus on evaluation as an accountability mechanism.
Bovens (2010) explains that meanings of accountability incorporate normative
visions of transparency and virtue, and potentially organisational mechanisms
through which agents answer to their principals – an important issue for
climate change policy, which often involves numerous actors at various gov-
ernance levels (Feldman and Wilt 1996, Jordan et al. 2015, 2018, Schoenefeld
and Jordan 2017). In seeking to link evaluation and accountability, the relevant
literatures mainly focus on the latter function, envisaging evaluation as an
enabler of accountability (Stame 2003, Hanberger 2012) through processes of
policy surveillance (see Aldy 2014). As Alkin and Christie assume: ‘[t]he need
and desire for accountability presents a need for evaluation’ (2004, p. 12). To
fulﬁl this role, many scholars emphasise the need for ‘independent’ evaluations
that are removed from the turmoil of everyday politics (Weiss 1993, Feldman
and Wilt 1996). For example, Chelimsky envisions evaluation as being largely
external to government, emphasising that ‘[a]fter all, evaluation exists to report
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on government, not to be a part of it’ (2009, p. 65). Relatedly, Hildén (2011)
stresses that powerful governmental actors may constrain government-
sponsored or -produced evaluations. Taken together, evaluation may support
key accountability mechanisms within states (Hanberger 2012).
However, there is a growing recognition that, particularly in an EU
context, hierarchical, state-like structures have, in part, given way to more
networked (e.g. Rhodes 1996) and, especially in the case of climate change,
increasingly polycentric governance arrangements (see Dorsch and
Flachsland 2017, Jordan et al. 2018). High levels of complexity and multiple
actors in environmental governance make it especially diﬃcult to ascertain
who should be held accountable for which policy outcomes (van der Meer
and Edelenbos 2006); a very politicised activity since holding organisations
accountable for their actions is highly visible compared to, for example, the
potentially subtler politics within ex-ante assessment of exploring potential
impacts. New forms of accountability have thus emerged, such as horizontal
accountability to a range of actors, including civil society (Bovens 2007,
Hertting and Vedung 2012). This has profound implications for evaluation:
if there is not one but many principals, evaluation may require broader
approaches and multiple criteria (Hanberger 2012), as well as the involve-
ment of numerous stakeholders (Hertting and Vedung 2012). Recent
debates have thus focused on multiple criteria and triangulation in EU
environmental policy evaluation (Mickwitz 2013). Scholars have often envi-
sioned evaluation as an enabler of accountability in state-like and increas-
ingly networked governance through knowledge provision. Some even
argue that evaluation enables democratic processes by stimulating debate
(Toulemonde 2000, Stame 2006).
Thus far we have discussed a normative case for evaluation as an
accountability mechanism, but what do we know about the extent to
which such accountability functions actually materialise in the EU?
Recent evidence casts some doubt on these optimistic, normative visions
for evaluation as an accountability mechanism. In a study of 220 legislative
evaluations, Zwaan et al. (2016) found that only 16% were discussed in the
European Parliament; even then, the main motivation appears to have been
agenda-setting rather than holding the European Commission to account.
While their study only considers evaluations carried out for the European
Commission, it points to the need to further empirically investigate the
assumed accountability functions of evaluation.
Learning
The second commonly discussed evaluation driver is policy improvement
or policy learning. However, does a desire to learn actually stimulate
evaluation? Much like accountability, policy learning is a contested concept,
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involving many diﬀerent forms (Zito and Schout 2009). In turn, these often
arise from diﬀerent perspectives on the nature of EU governance and its
functions (see Radaelli and Dunlop 2013). Evaluation is often assumed to
deliver critical inputs to stimulate learning (the so-called objectivist view)
or to facilitate a process through which participants learn (the more argu-
mentative view) (Borrás and Højlund 2015; see also Hildén 2011). Thus, as
Haug argues, ‘[e]x-post evaluation of programmes or policies […] is
a widely applied group of approaches aimed at stimulating learning in
environmental governance’ (2015, p. 5). Hanberger (2012) develops the
objectivist view to propose that a more hierarchical state-like organisation
would beneﬁt from information on policy eﬀectiveness, whereas more net-
work-like settings require evaluation that focuses on how collaboration
works. States would thus learn from their elites using evaluation, while
networks would learn from collective processes that evaluation enables
(Hanberger 2012). This demonstrates that many evaluation and governance
literatures still envision learning as a more or less direct ‘feedback loop’,
meaning that actors learn through the knowledge they receive from evalua-
tion. Relatedly, the WWF argued in its Climate Policy Tracker for the EU
that ‘[t]he evaluation of past performance is important to verify the eﬀec-
tiveness and eﬃciency of measures, to learn about their driving forces and
adjust policies accordingly’ (2010, p. 16). This goes hand-in-glove with
a rational ‘evidence-based’ policy-making view (for a fuller discussion, see
Sanderson 2002).
Nevertheless, do such normative beliefs about evaluation’s role in
learning actually materialise in practice, or are references to learning
largely rhetorical devices in order to justify evaluation done for other,
more political, reasons? Long ago, evaluation scholars realised that the
direct, linear use of evaluation is extremely rare (Weiss 1999). They
stress how learning works through more nuanced and indirect pro-
cesses (Zito and Schout 2009), such as Weiss’s (1999) ‘enlightenment’,
or situations where evaluation and monitoring exercises may perform
more of a ‘radar’ function (Radaelli and Dunlop 2013). This is at least
in part because evaluation is by no means the only source of knowl-
edge and pressure on policy-makers (Weiss 1999). Challengingly, learn-
ing as improvement vis-à-vis evaluation ultimately requires consensus
on policy values meaning that things are ‘improving’ on dimensions
that particular actors deem relevant, important, and thus worthy of
action.
This state of aﬀairs generates at least two pertinent research questions: ﬁrst,
what do we know about the extent to which environmental evaluations
facilitate learning? Focusing on ‘government learning’, Borrás and Højlund
(2015) investigated the learning arising from three evaluations commissioned
by the European Commission (two focusing on environmental policy). Based
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on intensive interview research, they found that learning did take place, with
programme or unit oﬃcers and external evaluators among the prime learners.
It ranged from gaining a fuller overview of the policy area to learning about
new evaluation methodologies, although interviewees stressed the incremental
nature of both processes (Borrás and Højlund 2015). Focusing on climate
policy in Finland, Hildén (2011) highlighted multiple forms of learning, but
also detected political and rhetorical learning.
Together, these ﬁndings indicate that evaluation may indeed con-
tribute to learning at EU level, but more research is required to assess
what kind and under what conditions learning occurs as a function of
evaluation. Second, it is pertinent to ask why the simplistic, linear view
of learning appears to persist among evaluation scholars and especially
practitioners, and what may be the alternative (e.g. more political)
drivers of evaluation? The next section addresses these questions.
Political opportunity structures
Actors also use evaluation in order to manipulate political opportunity
structures (McAdam 1996) as part of much broader political struggles
(Bovens et al. 2006, Weiss 1993, Vedung 1997). Evaluation may expand
or reduce the ‘scope of political conﬂict’ (Schattschneider 1975) by bringing
certain actors into policy discussions, for example, through direct participa-
tion in an evaluation as a ‘stakeholder’ or by using evaluation results in
public debates (see the introduction to this special issue, Zito et al. 2019).
The more polycentric climate governance ‘opportunity structure’ emerging
from the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) and its application in the EU
(see Tosun and Schoenefeld 2017, Ringel and Knodt 2018) is likely to
expand such access points. However, evaluations can also exclude actors
or end discussion by delegating debates to evaluators or by eﬀectively
delaying political processes (Pollitt 1998). For some actors, engagement in
evaluation has little to do with enabling accountability or fostering learning
through evaluation; rather, it is a way to manipulate opportunity structures
in order to advance their political goals. We thus should not understand
evaluation as a ‘clinical, experimental science’, but something that is part
and parcel of wider political processes (see Weiss 1993).
At a fairly basic level, evaluation may allow certain actors to participate
in governance processes, and potentially shut out others (and thus aﬀect the
participatory structure). Manipulating political opportunity structures may
furthermore involve shifting power relations among actors (see Schoenefeld
and Jordan 2017) by legitimising certain actions, actors, or ideas, and de-
legitimising others (Hanberger 2012). Actors may commission evaluations
simply to appear legitimate (i.e. by claiming that their decisions are evi-
dence-based), with little interest in the results of the exercise. Alternatively,
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they may use evaluations for political or symbolic, rather than more sub-
stantial, forms of learning. Actors may also utilise evaluation in order to
avoid political conﬂict and/or escape blame (see Howlett 2014). The crea-
tion of evaluation units within the European Commission, and since 2014
a dedicated Commissioner for better regulation, have certainly sent a strong
political signal by strengthening the institutional basis of evaluation. There
are, however, other elements of evaluation that relate to the governance
questions noted above: actors may decide to evaluate (or not) based on
their pre-conceptions of policy success, or they may seek to inﬂuence the
evaluation process so that the results suit pre-deﬁned policy objectives (as
a form of policy-based evidence). Policy-makers may even seek to
legitimise certain policies by subjecting them to repeated evaluations.
A common response to these issues has often been to devise mechanisms
that protect evaluators and their organisations from political pressure, for
example, by creating independent evaluation units (Chelimsky 2009). There
have thus been multiple attempts to organise the politics out of evaluation.
These attempts to depoliticise completely evaluation have often been futile
however, as evaluation always involves making value judgements (see Vedung
1997). Working towards a fuller understanding of manipulating political
opportunity structures through evaluation requires an understanding of the
various actors involved in pursuing, ﬁnancing, commissioning, and/or con-
ducting evaluations, and their core motivations. To date, our knowledge of
actor motivation is at best patchy and at worst non-existent in the area of
environment and climate policy in the EU (but see Schoenefeld and Jordan
2017). It is then also useful to understand the nature of the evaluation
processes, the outputs and ideas they generate, and the usage of the outcomes –
for example, in agenda-setting and policy formulation. In recent years, scholars
have endeavoured to address these important empirical questions generally,
and also with regard to environment and climate evaluation. This work details
the growing evaluation activities in the European Commission as one key actor
in pursuit of evaluation (e.g. Højlund 2015, Mastenbroek et al. 2016), but also
increasingly the European Court of Auditors (e.g. Stephenson 2015), the EEA
(EEA 2016, Schoenefeld et al. 2018), or across the EU as a whole (e.g. Stern
2009, Jacob et al. 2015).
Extant work has often focused on mapping the evaluation outputs of
particular EU institutions. For example, Mastenbroek et al. (2016) found 216
studies focusing on ex-post legislative evaluation conducted by the European
Commission and van Voorst and Mastenbroek (2017) have elaborated on it to
test causal models. Warren (2014) conducted a meta-evaluation of experiences
with demand-side energy policy. One of the key challenges of these literatures
is that the sampling criteria for collecting evaluations vary widely, so that it is
diﬃcult if not impossible to compare their results, let alone explore the reasons
for evaluation growth. For example, Huitema et al. (2011) included academic
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articles as ‘evaluations’ in their study, while Mastenbroek et al. (2016) only
focused on evaluations by the European Commission. By contrast, Warren
(2014) drew on academic databases in his analysis, but neglected evaluations
published in other venues, such as those identiﬁed by Mastenbroek et al.
(2016). In sum, working towards clearer concepts that can be operationalised
is a key ﬁrst step in advancing this ﬁeld towards more causal explanations of its
politics (and the other drivers).
An emerging and important line of research considers the relationship
between those who commission evaluations and those who conduct them.
In a survey, Hayward et al. (2014) showed how members of the British
government frequently aimed to inﬂuence the evaluators that they had
commissioned to conduct evaluations, whether through inﬂuencing their
methodologies or during the ﬁnal write-up; Pleger and Sager (2016) have
discovered similar dynamics in Germany and Switzerland. Even though
earlier studies demonstrate that EU-level actors frequently commission
environment and especially climate policy evaluations (Huitema et al.
2011), these dynamics have not yet been suﬃciently explored.
Next steps
A key shortcoming of the existing literatures reviewed above is that they have
hardly considered the drivers of evaluation side-by-side, either theoretically
or empirically, especially in the case of EU environmental policy. As a ﬁrst
step, this section begins to work across them theoretically, a key endeavour in
order to enable new theory-driven, empirical explorations. Second, it looks at
recent empirical work that has begun to lay bare potential overlaps, as well as
tensions, between the drivers.
Working across the drivers theoretically
As a ﬁrst step towards building a more comprehensive understanding,
Figure 1 maps the theoretical concepts and identiﬁes their main overlaps
and/or tensions.
Figure 1 depicts each driver in a circle in order to identify tensions and/or
overlap between them, drawing on existing evaluation literatures. The ﬁgure
aﬀords signiﬁcant space to each of the three drivers in order to propose that it
appears conceptually helpful to understanding them individually (i.e. we found
no indication of a perfect overlap between any two drivers in the evaluation
literatures). Equally, we identiﬁed areas with signiﬁcant potential conceptual
overlap between the drivers. For example, instances where ‘learning’ and ‘manip-
ulating political opportunity structures’ occur simultaneously may lead to ‘poli-
tical learning’. Similarly, when accountability and manipulating political
opportunity structures overlap, a theoretical result may become some form of
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policing or control. Last, a potential conceptual overlap between learning and
accountability is less clear and points to tension between the two, but Regeer
et al. (2016) argue for extending the concept of accountability in order to make
learning a sub-set of it – but they acknowledge that evaluation focuses more on
accountability than on learning. Stame (2003) writes that potential overlaps
between accountability and learning depend on the relationship between prin-
cipals and agents at the outset; if organisational goals are similar, the evaluation
can serve a productive role, both in enabling accountability and potentially
learning (complementarity – see also Sabel 1994, OECD 2001); however, if
organisational goals diﬀer, accountability functions may come at the cost of
reduced or even no learning eﬀects (antagonism). One concept that has been
advanced to incorporate both (while arguable ignoring the potential tensions) is
policy surveillance, which Aldy (2018, p. 211) argues includes
reporting and monitoring of relevant climate policy performance data, as well
as the analysis and evaluation of those data. Doing so can facilitate learning
about the eﬃcacy of mitigation eﬀorts…
However, particularly where few concepts point to an overlap between the
drivers in Figure 1, tensions may emerge that may prevent the simultaneous
manifestation of the normative ideals articulated through the three evaluation
drivers as a consequence of evaluation. This is because theoretically one could
expect signiﬁcant antagonism or tension between the drivers. For example, if
































































Figure 1. Learning, accountability, and political opportunities through evaluation.
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would want the evaluation to take long enough (from their perspective), and
put lower emphasis on the usefulness of the evaluation in order to, for example,
stimulate learning or enable accountability (both of which would beneﬁt from
evaluation insights becoming available at suitable times).
Tension is especially likely to emerge between concepts that only feature in
a single circle. For example, a key theoretical tension may emerge between
accountability and manipulating political opportunity structures. If actors
use evaluation in order to manipulate political opportunity structures (e.g. to
delay processes or bring in new actors) and thus deeply implicate evaluation
with the related governance processes, it is all but impossible to
conceptualise evaluation, at the same time, as an ‘external’ accountability
mechanism. Ironically, evaluation may thus become subject to accountability
pressures, such as when diﬀerent organisations commission competing eva-
luations in order to support or delegitimise certain ideas. In sum, the extent
to which these processes are antagonistic or complementary still requires
more conceptual exploration.
Working across the drivers empirically
Exposing the theoretical and often deeply normative arguments outlined in the
previous sections to empirical scrutiny is a key, but only partially realised,
objective. Empirical analyses of interactions between the three drivers have
often concentrated on just a few of the wide range of potential overlaps and/or
tensions. The interstitials between learning and accountability attract most
attention. Sabel (1994) has noted that monitoring could lead to learning if
institutions forge mutual interest among various actors, who then come to
understand an ongoing conversation about monitoring standards and outcomes
as a learning opportunity. However, others argue that diﬀerent evaluation
approaches either suit learning or accountability: Højlund (2015), for example,
explains that summative evaluations (at the end of a policy) are more account-
ability-oriented, whereas formative evaluations (occurring while a policy is being
implemented)may bemore geared towards learning. Tensions between account-
ability and learning may also emerge because evaluations can be used to name
and shame governance actors, and they are eﬀectively a control function, which
can erode trust and a willingness to consider seriously potential improvements
(Hermans 2009). Similarly, van der Meer and Edelenbos have highlighted that:
Evaluations that primarily have an accountability function tend to be public
and are often performed by external evaluators. Units whose policies, man-
agement or implementation activities are being evaluated will often be
inclined to defend their actions and achievements. (2006, p. 209)
Højlund (2015) has documented how evaluation in the European Commission
has oscillated between accountability and learning. More streamlining since
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the 1990s has usually meant a greater focus on accountability/control, and less
on learning. While accountability and learning may not always be opposed to
each other, more empirical evidence is needed to investigate their relation-
ships. This is especially because high political hopes are currently investing in
the accountability and learning functions of evaluation in the EU. For example,
the Research Service of the European Parliament concludes that
Evaluation is an important element for the proper functioning of the policy
cycle. It serves many purposes, for instance assessing how a particular policy
intervention has performed in comparison with expectations […]. Evaluation is
also a means of fostering transparency and accountability towards citizens and
stakeholders. Last but not least, evaluation provides evidence for policy-
makers in deciding whether to continue, modify or terminate a policy inter-
vention. (Schreﬂer 2016, 5 – emphasis added)
The EEA has recently expressed similar expectations about environment and
climate evaluation in the EU (EEA 2016), which is again a call to researchers
to assess whether these hopes materialise. We contend that it is very much an
open question – both theoretically and empirically – whether evaluation can
and does fulﬁl these high expectations in the areas of environment and
climate policy. The implicit assumption in the quote above is that evaluation
can fulﬁl all these roles at the same time. There is little recognition of
potential or real tensions between the accountability and learning functions
of evaluation, or that evaluation could also serve as ammunition in political
battles. The hopes in the quote thus contrast sharply with emerging theore-
tical debates and empirical evidence on these dynamics.
Work is also emerging on the overlap between manipulating political
opportunity structures and accountability. Schoenefeld et al. (2018) show
how EU Member States were reluctant to strengthen climate policy mon-
itoring in 2013 lest it increased the power of EU level actors. As Stame
(2003) writes, monitoring is a less ‘intrusive’ activity than evaluation – in
the case of the latter, concerns over control may be even stronger. As
Schoenefeld et al. (2018) discuss, this may have severe ramiﬁcations for
learning, because patchy and insuﬃcient knowledge as well as limited
indicators have disabled broader climate governance debates. Finally, the
overlap between manipulating political opportunity structures and learning
with a view to improving EU environmental policy evaluation is ripe for
deeper empirical exploration.
While exploring the three drivers in pairs is certainly helpful, ultimately
it would be useful to explore empirically all three in conjunction; that is,
exploring the central area in Figure 1. A good place to begin addressing this
research challenge is the EEA, which is central to many environmental
policy knowledge development and dissemination activities (Martens 2010).
Whereas the European Commission and Member States have generally
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preferred the EEA to focus on data collection, the European Parliament
prefers a stronger role in policy analysis in order to hold the Commission
and the Council to account (Martens 2010). These tensions have certainly
manifested in the EEA’s approach to monitoring climate policies. A recent
analysis of the outputs of the EU’s Monitoring Mechanism on climate
change – which the EEA manages – identiﬁed a range of political conﬂicts
and tensions, ranging from Member State concern over reporting costs to
fears of losing political control over knowledge generation and sharing and,
potentially, even future target setting (Schoenefeld et al. 2018). By the same
token, we know much less about the activities of non-governmental actors
in evaluation (see Hildén et al. 2014).
There are other examples of new research that has worked across the three
drivers. For instance, van Voorst and Mastenbroek (2017) empirically tested
motivations for evaluation – including aspects of accountability, learning,
and politics – ﬁnding that the Commission is most likely to evaluate in order
to enforce legislation (hence more accountability than learning), and when
evaluation capacities are high. They did not ﬁnd that politicisation in the
Council (i.e. the apex of decision-making and hence the most openly political
level) aﬀected the initiation and framing of particular evaluations.
Conclusions
Since the original special issue on EU environmental policy (Judge 1992),
evaluation has become an important element of environmental policymaking
in the EU, and hence should be accounted for in any attempt to take stock of
EU environmental policy and governance. There has undoubtedly been a clear
change at EU level, expressed by the steep growth in political support and
demand for evaluation, resource investments, and evaluation outputs. This
change has been gradual over time, with an initial international impetus in the
1960s, followed by a strengthening of evaluation-related language in the EU
Environmental Action Programs. In the last ten years, the institutionalisation
of evaluation has materialised with many more evaluations published, together
with leadership from the relevant European institutions and new guidance on
best practice. Drawing on various existing literatures, we argue that evaluation
has emerged from three core underlying drivers: a quest to foster policy
learning; a perceived need for greater accountability; and a desire to manip-
ulate political opportunity structures. We unpacked each driver theoretically
and explored its empirical relevance before making a ﬁrst attempt to work
across the three drivers theoretically.We then drew on the emerging literatures
on evaluation in order to explore the extent to which some of the overlaps and/
or tensions between the drivers have been empirically explored.
High levels of complexity and uncertainty typically characterise environ-
mental (and especially climate change) policy (Mickwitz 2013) and make
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the conceptualisation of accountability, learning, and politics especially
challenging and related eﬀects empirically hard to detect. This is especially
because many environmental issues including climate change do not neatly
coincide with existing political jurisdictions (Bruyninckx 2009). The nature
of the ﬁeld thus invites multiple evaluation approaches and diversity in
evaluation (Mickwitz 2006). Unlike more mature areas of EU evaluation
such as structural funding and international development in which it is
abundantly clear who has an active interest in evaluation (the Member
States, as donors), in the ﬁelds of environment and climate policy the
overall picture is murkier (see Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017). While we
have some knowledge about which actors have in the past advocated
evaluations and for what reasons, there has been a marked reluctance to
open up the associated political and institutional aspects to further scrutiny.
Future research is necessary in order to further disentangle the diﬀerent
drivers and especially, to assess their empirical relevance (e.g. does a rhetorical
emphasis on accountability and/or learning functions of evaluation really
materialise empirically, or are political factors more prominent?), and thereby
test the relationships we proposed in Figure 1. Where can we identify further
evidence of tension and/or overlap between the drivers and the sub-concepts
included in the Figure? In the area of environmental policy it matters who is
undertaking evaluation, where, when, why, how, for what reasons, and with
what consequences. This includes paying close attention to evaluation across
diﬀerent governance levels (i.e. is evaluation done at EU level, in the Member
States, or elsewhere, including the relationships between diﬀerent evaluation
actors?). The world is clearly anxious to evaluate whether or not it is on
a development path that avoids catastrophic climate change (see EEA 2016). It
is telling that the performance of wholly new governance initiatives such as the
post-Paris Review Process (Christoﬀ 2016) and EU energy governance ride on
monitoring and evaluation exercises that are relatively novel and still ﬁnding
their feet (Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017, Ringel and Knodt 2018). The currently
uneven patterns of empirical insight result in part from very limited data
availability; even very simple evaluation databases remain rare.
The fact that evaluation is on the rise in EU environmental governance,
both theoretically and empirically, does not necessarily imply that this is
unequivocally a normatively desirable development. Even though it is possi-
ble to document the rise of evaluation, research on its use, eﬀects, and
governance is only just emerging (see Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017).
Furthermore, researchers could also engage with factors beyond the three
arguably functional drivers considered here, including issues of power
(Partzsch 2017) and the role of state (Duit et al. 2016) and non-state actors
(Bäckstrand et al. 2017) in evaluation (Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017), as well
as at the level of individual organisations (see Pattyn 2014). It would also be
helpful to know how far the three core drivers and their relationships in the
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EU environmental sector are applicable to other sectors and to other levels of
governance. Comparative theoretical and empirical explorations that work
across a range of diﬀerent policy sectors could thus be very illuminating. In
all these diﬀerent ways, researchers stand to learn about environmental
policy and politics by reﬂecting on policy evaluation.
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